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Abstract 
 
Until now there was little evidence of the influence of large governments on happiness 
and when it existed, it was positive. We show that structural government consumption 
and other measures of long-term government imbalances significantly decrease 
happiness and life satisfaction in European countries. In some cases there is evidence of 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between the Government burden and happiness, for 
which the negative relationship begin just before the median. This evidence may lead 
European politicians to reject the idea that bigger Governments lead to higher people 
satisfaction and to win elections. This result is consistent with people valuing 
(negatively) expectations for future tax increases, macroeconomic imbalances, and 
austerity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this article, we present, for the first time, estimations of the effects of structural government 
consumption and related government variables in happiness and life satisfaction. To this end, we use the 
European Quality of Life Surveys, waves 2003 and 2007, to collect individual microdata for socio-
economic indicators, and also for life satisfaction, and happiness. We complete the dataset with measures 
of structural government consumption (in % of GDP), structural government balances (in % of GDP), and 
public debt (in % of GDP). We aim to provide evidence on whether large governments decrease 
happiness (or not). This should enlighten politicians in what concerns their usual desire to increase 
government intervention in order to appraise electors. In fact, as we may conclude below, previous 
contributions have highlighted positive effects of deficits, government expenditures or at least of some 
types of expenditures (such as welfare state variables) on variables linked with wellbeing, such as 
happiness and life satisfaction. The corollary of these results would be then that there is a justification to 
larger governments, since it increases citizen’s happiness (although the literature pointed out no 
justification concerning the negative relationship between government size and growth). We re-address 
this issue and we show that larger governments decrease happiness. These results re-launch the debate 
about the relationship between the size of the government and happiness and seem to cast doubts on the 
reasoning according to which larger governments and a generous welfare state may be justifiable through 
its relationship with happiness. 
As shown in MacKerron (2012), since the late nineties of the XX
th
 century the number of articles dealing 
with happiness has grown exponentially. However, most have concentrated on the relationship between 
income and happiness, finding that while richer countries tend to have, on average, higher levels of 
happiness, continuous increases in income cannot be associated with happier populations. This 
phenomenon has been named the Easterly Paradox (for recent attempts to solve the Easterly paradox see 
e.g. Clark et al., 2007; Bartolini and Bilancini, 2010; Choudhary et al., 2011). 
The effect of other macroeconomic variables on happiness has also been subject to some research. As 
MacKerron (2012) puts it, high unemployment rates may reduce wellbeing, although research is limited, 
(but high local unemployment rates may also ameliorate the impact of an individual’s own 
unemployment); inflation may also have a negative influence on wellbeing, especially for those who 
favor right wing politics. Evidence on income inequality is mixed; its effect may depend partially on real 
or perceived mobility. Some articles have analyzed the impact of crises in happiness. While Greve (2012) 
did not find any association between the economic crises of 2010 in European countries and happiness, 
Deaton (2011) found a strong correlation between individual well-being and the stock market indexes in 
the USA. 
The connection between the role of the Government and happiness has been, in some degree, a neglected 
subject in the literature. There are some studies that address the effects of social insurance and the welfare 
state (MacKerron, 2012). Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) identified positive effects of the welfare state 
on happiness for OECD countries. Some evidence of the effect of social security measures is also 
provided by Uhde (2010) in which the fall in social security expenditures may explain the decrease in life 
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satisfaction in Germany since 2001, despite of having increased material prosperity. The effects of 
governments in happiness have also been analyzed using political variables such as democracy, with a 
positive effect (MacKerron, 2012) and also bureaucratic accountability and transparency, which has 
contributed to reduce the disparities in well-being in US states (Luechinger et al., 2013).  
The effects of government expenditures, deficits, and austerity measures in happiness and well-being 
were only sparsely analyzed until now, as recognized by Kim and Kim (2012). For instance, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2008) presented a statistically significant and positive effect of unemployment benefits in 
happiness, a specific item of government expenditure. In fact, in the working paper version of that article 
the authors presented regressions (Table 1A) in which government expenditure has a significantly 
positive effect in happiness. In a master thesis, Jimenez (2011) evaluated the effects of government size in 
happiness but she has done that in regressions in which all data are aggregate, which is a clearly inferior 
option when compared to studies that use microdata for individual features. Yamamura (2011) – for 
Japan, Kiyia (2012) – for the USA, and Akay et al. (2012) – for Germany -, presented evidence of a 
positive or at least non-significant effect of government size on happiness, using expenditures’ size and 
composition in the first two and taxes on the third, respectively, as measures of government size. Hessami 
(2010) access the effect of size and composition of government expenditures on life satisfaction. The 
author found a positive effect of government size on life satisfaction. This positive effect seems to 
decrease with the size of the government (the so-called inverted U-shaped relationship), with relative 
income, ideological preferences, and corruption and seems to increase with expenditures decentralization. 
Whether these last effects seem to be quantitatively meaningful, the negative effect of government size 
(the right-side of the inverted U) does not have practical significance as globally it would occur only after 
the government expenditure (as % of GDP) exceeds 115%,
2
 value that is out of the observed values by the 
author (see e.g. their Figure 2). None of these articles analyzed the effect of the government size 
independently of the effect of expansions or recessions. We fill this gap, concentrating on structural (or 
long-run) measures. In fact, it is possible that agents value positively the countercyclical measures 
governments take to overcome or alleviate recessions. Thus the positive effects obtained so far in the 
literature may overestimate the role of government expenditures in smoothing recessions. The fact that 
most of the positive effects were obtained from regressions using welfare state expenditures as 
independent variables, namely unemployment protection, may be suggestive of this idea. 
Following the argument stressed by Deaton (2011) then applied to the effects of financial markets, we 
also consider that the conditional effects of the government size in the economy as well as government 
imbalances may reflect, not only the desire for a stable macroeconomic environment and balanced 
government accounts, but also the fear from future increases in taxes or future austerity, i.e., following the 
principles of Ricardian Equivalence. Following this argument, we estimate the effects of several structural 
(or long-run) measures of government size on happiness or life satisfaction (which in this paper are the 
measures for individual wellbeing). 
                                                          
2
 This value results from coefficients in Table 1. Results in Table 2 yield a threshold of 60.25%, in Table 
3, 103.5% and in Table 5, 63.5%. All these values are at the upper bound (or above the upper limit) of the 
interval in Figure 2. 
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we enlarge the study of the influence of government 
expenditure in happiness to almost 30 countries while previous analysis restricts to individual countries or 
at most to 12 European countries. Second, contrary to analyzing the effect of different components of the 
government expenditures on happiness, as previous contributions did, we concentrate on the influence of 
structural or long-run measures of the government weight in the economy. Finally, we found an 
unexpected negative effect of government weight on happiness, which remains valid through several 
robustness checks. 
This work has the following structure: In Section 2 we describe the data and methods used and in section 
3 we describe the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
 
We collected data from the European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS) - waves 2003 and 2007 - 
concerning individual characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, education, number of children, 
type of habitation, income, main economic status (professions), number of hours worked, health, life 
satisfaction, and happiness. Life satisfaction and happiness are used as substitute (dependent) variables in 
regressions. Life satisfaction is measured on a scale of 1 to 10, of the answer to the following question 
‘All things considered, how satisfied you say you are with your life?’, while happiness is measured on a 
scale of 1 to 10, of the answer to the question ‘Taking all things together, how happy would you say you 
are?’
3
 We run separate regressions for the waves 2003 and 2007.
4
 EQLS is carried out every four years 
and examines both the objective circumstances of European citizens' lives and how they feel about those 
circumstances and their lives in general. It is the successor of the Eurobarometer Survey Series used by 
some of the previous literature to access the relationship between Government and Happiness (as e.g. 
Hessami, 2010). 
Concerning the effect of government size on happiness and life satisfaction we choose two forms of 
structural government expenditures: (1) the ratio of government consumption to the trend of GDP - / 
and (2) the ratio of trend government consumption to the trend of GDP - ̅/. We use the Hodrick-
Prescott filter to calculate the trend variables of each variable for each country. These variables were 
taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0, considering the time span between 1980 and 2010 to calculate the 
trend of both series. International organizations tend to use trend GDP in their calculations of structural 
government balances. However they tend to calculated the structural component of government 
consumption by subtracting cyclical consumption mainly associated with unemployment protection (see 
e.g. Bodmer and Geier, 2004). Due to the fact that some other government consumption may be also 
cyclical (e.g. poverty relief expenditures) and the difficulty on estimating the natural unemployment rate 
                                                          
3
 A detailed description of all variables used in this work can be found in Appendix, Table 1.A. 
4
 A possible alternative approach would be to pool both datasets in just one. This alternative procedure 
would find problems such as different coverage between waves – different waves cover different samples 
and different measurement across different waves – variables such as age and education are measured 
differently in 2003 and 2007. There were certainly methods to pool both datasets, but we are sure that 
more concise results would be obtained at the expense of an increase in measurement error issues. 
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for each country, we use the trend variable to evaluate the long-run component. However, just to compare 
with the total government size as a share of GDP, we also calculate /. In order to evaluate the 
robustness of our results, we also use other structural measures of government, such as structural balance 
and public debt, calculated by the Eurostat, in a following section of the paper. We have averaged 
structural government consumption from 1998 to 2003 and from 2002 to 2007 and associated it with 
happiness in 2003 and 2007, respectively. With this option we are focusing on the effect of government 
consumption on happiness, not including government capital expenditures, as the majority of previous 
contributions did. This allows us to disentangle positive effects of government investments in growth or 
externalities that could be valued positively by agents. Moreover, like some previous references have 
uncovered positive effects of the welfare state on happiness, current government expenditure (or 
government consumption) is a good variable to represent the role of the state as a provider of social 
welfare. Additionally, government consumption is also the variable linked with government policy that 
has been most related to economic growth in the literature, with a negative influence (e.g. Hauk and 
Wackziarg, 2009). If government consumption is positively related to happiness or life satisfaction, as 
previous works seem to suggest, there would be a trade-off between growth and welfare implied by 
government consumption, and this could justify expansionary government consumption by politicians, 
despite a negative effect on growth. However, if the result is the opposite, there would be no reasonable 
argument that supports policies that systematically increase government consumption on the long-run. 
Additionally, in order to access the influence of a number of variables calculated by international 
organizations, namely those calculated by the Eurostat and used for the excessive deficit procedure by the 
European Commission, we also include public debt (general government consolidated gross debt) and the 
structural balances of general government, both in percentage of potential (trend) GDP. 
We estimate equation (1) presented below through the Ordered Probit and the OLS methods. This 
equation is our benchmark regression both on life satisfaction and happiness (we name these dependent 
variables WB, standing for wellbeing). 
 
	, =  + ,	, + ,	, + ,	, +  ,	, +  ,	, + !"#$_&'_,	, +
("#$_)'_,	, + *+,,	, + -.ℎ0),	, + 1,	, +∑ 345'67_,	,*348 +
∑ 396_,	,398- + ∑ 3:;'_,	,*3:8 + -<= 6>	,    (1) 
 
Where Incj,it is the household´s total net monthly income
5
, Heaj,i,t is the individual health conditions 
ranging between 1 (very good) and 5 (very bad), Eduj,i,t is the education level (measured in ISCED levels 
                                                          
5
 Some previous papers, as MacKerron (2012) noted, discovered that relative income is more important 
than absolute income in the explanation of wellbeing. However, some others as Angeles (2009) and 
Pouwels et al. (2008) prefer to use individual income to explain wellbeing. In particular, the last paper 
discovered that individual income gains importance if one takes into account the hours worked, as we also 
do. However, we tested the inclusion of relative income (individual income/average income, with the 
denominator been obtained through averaging all observations within each country. Although this 
variable becomes highly significant (more than absolute individual income, as is also pointed out in 
previous literature), this does not change any of our results and in particular it does not change the 
significance of other variables. These alternative results are available upon request. 
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in 2007 and in major education levels in 2003),  ,	,is the age category, which also appears squared in 
regressions, "#$_&'_,	, is a dummy that sets 1 if the individual is unemployed in less than 12 
months, "#$_)'_,	,is a dummy that sets 1 if the individual is unemployed for more than 12 months, 
+,,	,is the number of weekly hours worked, .ℎ0),	,is the number of children,	,	, is gender, 
assuming 1 for male and 2 for female, 5'67_,	, are a set of professional categories dummies, 
6_,	, are a set of dummies for house features linked with the nature of the property, ;'_,	,is a 
set of dummies for marriage status (for married, divorced, widowed, and never married), and finally 
<= 6>	,is one of the two structural government consumption measures discussed above (Stgov - / and 
Stgov1 - ̅/). The suffix _d in variables names means a dummy variable, i is the country indicator 
(EQLS 2003 includes 28 European countries and EQLS 2007 includes 31 European countries) and t = 
2003, 2007. Dependent variables are alternatively Life Satisfaction and Happiness. The dummies were 
included in the regressions but are omitted in the tables to allow for better readability and because their 
analysis is not the core of our analysis. This means that in our model there are individual effects and 
macro-effects as in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) and Hessami (2010). In our case, however, macro-
effects are measured by government variables. 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables 
 
Data for 2007 Data for 2003 
Variable N Average Std. Dev. Min Max N Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
Happiness 35380 7.336405 1.924874 1 10 25654 7.289429 1.98574 1 10 
Life Satisf 35472 6.888786 2.166989 1 10 25991 6.746528 2.216835 1 10 
Income 20328 1617.74 3482.832 2 250000 20498 1257.517 1296.985 75 5625 
Unemp_sr 35634 0.0206825 0.1423211 0 1 26257 0.0285638 0.1665802 0 1 
Unemp_lr 35634 0.0308133 0.1728139 0 1 26257 0.0360285 0.1863646 0 1 
Hours Worked 29983 40.28606 11.7069 1 168 21312 41.30546 12.7853 1 140 
Education 35011 3.947331 1.355418 1 7 26105 1.97376 0.7336173 1 4 
Health 35570 2.330391 0.966463 1 5 26191 3.010271 1.145108 1 5 
Age 35634 1.971263 0.6838658 1 3 26257 3.261721 1.273282 1 5 
Mar_1 35364 0.6185665 0.4857454 0 1 26257 0.5898998 0.491861 0 1 
Mar_2 35634 0.0930291 0.2904773 0 1 26257 0.0932323 0.2907632 0 1 
Mar_3 35634 0.1162934 0.320581 0 1 26257 0.1213772 0.3265713 0 1 
Mar_4 35634 0.1645339 0.3707645 0 1 26257 0.1866169 0.3896111 0 1 
Children 35359 1.655279 1.383903 0 14 25938 1.596345 1.428991 0 15 
Gender 35634 1.568895 0.4952377 1 2 26257 1.581026 0.4934005 1 2 
Stgov 35634 0.0747789 0.0195345 0.0424802 0.1387043 26257 0.0809 0.0245646 0.0433155 0.1368173 
Stgov1 35634 0.0747743 0.0191848 0.0416576 0.1341795 26257 0.0798974 0.0241151 0.0429177 0.145888 
Notes: In order to keep the table as simple as possible, summary statistics for dummies for professional and house categories are not presented 
 
The number of observations is around 26000 for 2003 and 35000 for 2007. Structural Government 
Consumption (Stgov) is measured in percentage and it ranges between 4% and 14%. Structural 
Government Consumption with trended Government Consumption (Stgov1) is measured in percentage, 
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and oscillates between 4% and 13.4% in 2007 and between 4% and 14.5% in 2003. It is worth noting that 
correlations between explanatory variables rarely overcome 30% (the only exceptions being the one 
between children and age and the one between age and health), which implies that we can disregard 
multicollinearity issues. 
As referred above, we present estimations obtained with the Ordered Probit method and also with the 
OLS method. While the OLS coefficients are straightforward to interpret, Ordered Probit estimations are 
more appropriated to estimate equations in which the dependent variable is ordinal, i.e., that have an order 
but no clear interpretation.  
 
3. The Effect of Structural Government Consumption in Individual 
Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
 
In this section we present our main results, concerning the influence of structural government 
consumption in happiness and in life satisfaction. A first note worth mentioning is that results for 
happiness and life satisfaction are incredibly close. Coefficients also do not change much between 
regressions that do not include government consumption and those which included those variables. From 
Table 2 below we can observe highly significant and positive effects of income, education, number of 
children, being female, being married
6
, and health effects (note that health is measured in inverse order, 
e.g. better health corresponds to lower numbers) as well as negative effects of long-run and short-run 
unemployment (short-run unemployment decreases its significance in OLS regressions), hours worked 
(only in OLS regressions) on happiness and life satisfaction. Age presents a U-shaped relationship with 
happiness and life satisfaction. These results are generally consistent with previous evidence on the 
individual effects on happiness (see e.g. MacKerron 2012). In fact the literature has consistently presented 
positive effects of income, ‘being married’ and health and negative effects of unemployment and a U-
shaped relationship with age. Although not so frequent, negative effects of working hours have also been 
presented by Pouwels et al. (2008) and Rätzel (2012). Despite the existence of mixed effects of education 
and having children in the literature there are a significant number of articles that also present positive 
effects (e.g. Di Tella et al., 2001 and Hayo and Seifert, 2003 for education effects and Angeles, 2009 for a 
positive effect of children). Columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), and (7)-(10) test the introduction of structural 
government consumption in regressions and present significantly positive effects. In Table 3 the same 
specifications are applied to the 2003 dataset. Despite the different sample to which the survey was 
applied in 2003, results are incredibly similar. We can again observe highly significant and positive 
effects of income, education, number of children, being male, being married, and health effects as well as 
negative effects of long-run and short-run unemployment and hours worked (only in OLS regressions), 
together with a non-linear typical relationship with age. Taking into account the OLS estimations, the 
effects of structural government consumption on happiness and life satisfaction mean that a 1% increase 
                                                          
6
 Other dummies for the married status such as divorced and widowed, not presented in Tables, have 
significant negative effects. 
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in government consumption in percentage of GDP implies less 0.07 to less 0.42 in the happiness and/or 
life satisfaction scales meaning a decrease between 0.7% and 4.2% in the relative position in the scale. 
This also means that a 5% increase in government consumption in percentage of GDP may imply a 
decrease in happiness and/or life satisfaction of 4.5% to 10.5%, representing sizeable effects. 
 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of regressors on happiness and life satisfaction regarding Ordered 
Probit estimations, as coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as in the OLS method. These values may 
be interpreted as the probability of reporting 10 (the maximum value in the scale for both variables) due 
to a unit increase in each variable. 
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Table 2: Regressions for Happiness and Life Satisfaction in 2007     
Method Ordered Probit  OLS   
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -- -- -- -- -- -- 
8.908435*** 8.924673*** 8.246053*** 8.282006*** 
(0.4376194) (0.4375811) (0.5228545) (0.5216138) 
Income 
0.00000324* 0.00000324* 0.00000324* 0.00000630** 0.00000630** 0.00000630** 0.0000156*** 0.0000153*** 0.0000326*** 0.0000321*** 
(0.00000192) (0.00000192) (0.00000192) (0.00000280) (0.00000280) (0.00000280) (0.00000543) (0.00000538) (0.0000111) (0.000011) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3253964*** -0.3253964*** -0.3253964*** -0.3416401*** -0.3416401*** -0.3416401*** -0.2786565 -0.2802844 -0.5485936* -0.5509983* 
(0.1119254) (0.1119254) (0.1119254) (0.1182577) (0.1182577) (0.1182577) (0.2913106) (0.2908684) (0.3305154) (0.329653) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4114606*** -0.4114606*** -0.4114606*** -0.4750684*** -0.4750684*** -0.4750684*** -0.5654893** -0.5653744** -0.9727996*** -0.9723034*** 
(0.1054442) (0.1054442) (0.1054442) (0.1123546) (0.1123546) (0.1123546) (0.2850709) (0.2846065) (0.3223266) (0.3213513) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0004002 -0.0004002 -0.0004002 -0.0012928 -0.0012928 -0.0012928 -0.0062292*** -0.0061534*** -0.0094005*** -0.009265*** 
(0.0008242) (0.0008242) (0.0008242) (0.0008129) (0.0008129) (0.0008129) (0.0013275) (0.0013278) (0.0014764) (0.0014763) 
Education 
0.0433858*** 0.0433858*** 0.0433858*** 0.0553147*** 0.0553147*** 0.0553147*** 0.1376807*** 0.1382745*** 0.1944765*** 0.1955898*** 
(0.0070014) (0.0070014) (0.0070014) (0.0070338) (0.0070338) (0.0070338) (0.0109365) (0.0109397) (0.0128151) (0.0128178) 
Health 
-0.4025707*** -0.4025707*** -0.4025707*** -0.3336939*** -0.3336939*** -0.3336939*** -0.656023*** -0.6548362*** -0.6315378*** -0.6294041*** 
(0.0107717) (0.0107717) (0.0107717) (0.0106194) (0.0106194) (0.0106194) (0.0168559) (0.0168625) (0.0186942) (0.018701) 
Age 
-0.4936903*** -0.4936903*** -0.4936903*** -0.4212954*** -0.4212954*** -0.4212954*** -0.7221477*** -0.7228026*** -0.6514263*** -0.6525312*** 
(0.0733333) (0.0733333) (0.0733333) (0.0734732) (0.0734732) (0.0734732) (0.1182457) (0.1182698) (0.1361452) (0.1362051) 
Age2 
0.111361*** 0.111361*** 0.111361*** 0.1169483*** 0.1169483*** 0.1169483*** 0.1844776*** 0.1844057*** 0.2163215*** 0.2161609*** 
(0.0188314) (0.0188314) (0.0188314) (0.0190846) (0.0190846) (0.0190846) (0.0307392) (0.0307471) (0.0352877) (0.0353041) 
Married 
0.3811907*** 0.3811907*** 0.3811907*** 0.2473287*** 0.2473287*** 0.2473287*** 0.7302369*** 0.7304895*** 0.4236384*** 0.4238679*** 
(0.0283387) (0.0283387) (0.0283387) (0.0277047) (0.0277047) (0.0277047) (0.0504122) (0.0504335) (0.0563734) (0.0564148) 
Children 
0.0273806*** 0.0273806*** 0.0273806*** 0.0164** 0.0164** 0.0164** 0.057784*** 0.057781*** 0.056638*** 0.0566317*** 
(0.0076089) (0.0076089) (0.0076089) (0.0076766) (0.0076766) (0.0076766) (0.0123764) (0.0123695) (0.0140446) (0.0140395) 
Gender 
0.069363*** 0.069363*** 0.069363*** 0.0404152** 0.0404152** 0.0404152** 0.0988221*** 0.0983017*** 0.0218993 0.0211131 
(0.0171341) (0.0171341) (0.0171341) (0.017178) (0.017178) (0.017178) (0.0277852) (0.0277938) (0.0315493) (0.0315654) 
Structural 
Government 
-- 
-16.7998*** 
-- -- 
-23.93304*** 
-- 
-12.85096*** 
-- 
-21.80282*** 
-- 
(1.841745) (1.910106) (0.7198392) (0.8366257) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-- -- 
-15.28416*** 
-- -- 
-21.77386*** 
-- 
-13.06357*** 
-- 
-22.26389*** 
(1.675587) (1.737781) (0.7467096) (0.8699706) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0795 0.0795 0.0795 0.0847 0.0847 0.0847 0.2323 0.2319 0.2302 0.2296 
Number Obs. 17244 17244 17244 17251 17251 17251 17244 17244 17251 17251 
 
Notes: Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, housing, and country dummies included in regressions but omitted from the Table. Country 
dummies are excluded from OLS regressions due to multicollinearity issues. 
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Table 3: Regressions for Happiness and Life Satisfaction in 2003     
Method Ordered Probit  OLS   
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -- -- -- -- -- -- 
9.271282*** 9.383672*** 8.307373*** 8.386828*** 
(0.3235361) (0.3218961) (0.359201) (0.3599114) 
Income 
0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.0001017*** 0.0001017*** 0.0001017*** 0.0002103*** 0.0001989*** 0.0003787*** 0.0003698*** 
(0.00000872) (0.00000872) (0.00000872) (0.00000881) (0.00000881) (0.00000881) (0.0000114) (0.0000114) (0.0000127) (0.0000127) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3923318*** -0.3923318*** -0.3923318*** -0.1630192 -0.1630192 -0.1630192 -0.6770241*** -0.6608273*** -0.4104402* -0.3838719 
(0.1346769) (0.1346769) (0.1346769) (0.1241655) (0.1241655) (0.1241655) (0.2209724) (0.2208957) (0.2371154) (0.2390753) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4855478*** -0.4855478*** -0.4855478*** -0.2563611** -0.2563611** -0.2563611** -0.9348814*** -0.9075121*** -0.7408687*** -0.6998154*** 
(0.1327912) (0.1327912) (0.1327912) (0.1225157) (0.1225157) (0.1225157) (0.2186781) (0.218589) (0.2345927) (0.2366777) 
Hours Worked 
0.000651 0.000651 0.000651 -0.0004375 -0.0004375 -0.0004375 -0.0008669 -0.0007542 -0.0045265*** -0.0044286*** 
(0.0007158) (0.0007158) (0.0007158) (0.0007243) (0.0007243) (0.0007243) (0.0011751) (0.0011749) (0.0013269) (0.0013263) 
Education 
0.0738424*** 0.0738424*** 0.0738424*** 0.0946408*** 0.0946408*** 0.0946408*** 0.125167*** 0.1315245*** 0.1496074*** 0.1568098*** 
(0.0124539) (0.0124539) (0.0124539) (0.0125244) (0.0125244) (0.0125244) (0.0208872) (0.020908) (0.0225737) (0.022576) 
Health 
-0.3597083*** -0.3597083*** -0.3597083*** -0.2903714*** -0.2903714*** -0.2903714*** -0.5819616*** -0.5816426*** -0.5436979*** -0.5446148*** 
(0.0097698) (0.0097698) (0.0097698) (0.0093471) (0.0093471) (0.0093471) (0.0144379) (0.0144143) (0.0157607) (0.0157343) 
Age 
-0.2750215*** -0.2750215*** -0.2750215*** -0.3390571*** -0.3390571*** -0.3390571*** -0.420471*** -0.4156832*** -0.5711091*** -0.565342*** 
(0.0438874) (0.0438874) (0.0438874) (0.0443508) (0.0443508) (0.0443508) (0.0728273) (0.0727576) (0.0814014) (0.0813208) 
Age2 
0.0425908*** 0.0425908*** 0.0425908*** 0.0601597*** 0.0601597*** 0.0601597*** 0.0739467*** 0.0734761*** 0.1157746*** 0.1152736*** 
(0.0071709) (0.0071709) (0.0071709) (0.0072363) (0.0072363) (0.0072363) (0.011955) (0.0119357) (0.0132617) (0.0132373) 
Married 
0.3736779*** 0.3736779*** 0.3736779*** 0.1964823*** 0.1964823*** 0.1964823*** 0.7839721*** 0.7858007*** 0.3520444*** 0.3501406*** 
(0.0273709) (0.0273709) (0.0273709) (0.0272644) (0.0272644) (0.0272644) (0.0555901) (0.0554051) (0.0593988) (0.0591814) 
Children 
0.0241429*** 0.0241429*** 0.0241429*** 0.0120988* 0.0120988* 0.0120988* 0.0317933*** 0.0295716** 0.0085037 0.0070545 
(0.0072689) (0.0072689) (0.0072689) (0.0073352) (0.0073352) (0.0073352) (0.0123717) (0.0123794) (0.0135364) (0.0135283) 
Gender 
0.100905*** 0.100905*** 0.100905*** 0.0994375*** 0.0994375*** 0.0994375*** 0.1478176*** 0.1528428*** 0.1528521*** 0.1571918*** 
(0.017418) (0.017418) (0.017418) (0.0173492) (0.0173492) (0.0173492) (0.0289492) (0.0288966) (0.0320482) (0.0319699) 
Structural 
Government 
-- 
-40.78204*** 
-- -- 
-24.1241** 
-- 
-7.44728*** 
-- 
-13.50108*** 
-- 
(10.40897) (10.33933) (0.6828288) (0.7299133) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-- -- 
-42.57944*** 
-- -- 
-25.18734** 
-- 
-9.196992*** 
-- 
-14.98166*** 
(10.86773) (10.79502) (0.706923) (0.7532219) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0811 0.0811 0.0811 0.0951 0.0951 0.0951 0.2435 0.2467 0.2686 0.2720 
Number Obs. 16364 16364 16364 16551 16551 16551 16364 16364 16551 16551 
Notes: Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, housing, and country dummies included in regressions but omitted from the Table. Country 
dummies are excluded from OLS regressions due to multicollinearity issues. 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects for Reporting Maximum Happiness and Life Satisfaction (Ordered Probit) 
 2007  2003 
 
Dep. Variable 
Variables 
Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Income 0.0000005* 0.0000008** 0.000009*** 0.00001*** 
Unemployment_sr -0.0372*** -0.0333*** -0.0477*** -0.0154 
Unemployment_lr -0.0446*** -0.0423*** -0.0556*** -0.0226*** 
Hours Worked -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.00005 
Education 0.0062*** 0.0070*** 0.0116*** 0.0101*** 
Health -0.0579*** -0.0420*** -0.0567*** -.0311*** 
Age -0.0710*** -0.0530*** -0.0433*** -0.0363*** 
Age2 0.0160*** 0.0147 0.0067*** 0.0064*** 
Married 0.0512*** 0.0296*** 0.0555*** 0.0203*** 
Children 0.0039*** 0.0021** 0.0038** 0.0012** 
Gender 0.0094*** 0.0051** 0.0159*** 0.0107*** 
Structural 
Government/ 
Structural 
Government1 
-2.4174***/ 
-2.1993*** 
-2.7378***/ 
-3.0093*** 
-6.425***/ 
-6.708*** 
-2.5852**/ 
-2.6991** 
 
Values in the table mean that, for example, an additional 100 euros in monthly income increases 
happiness and/or life satisfaction in 0.005% to 0.1%, a relatively modest effect, and with higher effects in 
2003 when compared to 2007. However, being unemployed decreases the probability of reporting the 
highest happiness and/or life satisfaction level from 1.5% to nearly 5%, one additional level of education 
increases the probability of reporting 10 in the scale from 0.7% to nearly 1.2% and the effect of one 
additional health point oscillates between a 4.2% and 8% rise in the probability of reporting the highest 
value in the scale. Belonging to an older age scale decreases 5.30% to 7.10% the probability of reporting 
10; being married increases 2.96% to 5.12% the probability of reporting the highest level of happiness 
and/or life satisfaction. Having children and being female have more modest effects of nearly 0.2% (to 
0.4%) and 0.5% (to 1.6%), respectively, of reporting the highest value in the scale. The quantitative effect 
of the size of governments is remarkable: an additional 1% of GDP in structural government consumption 
decreases the probability of reporting the highest value in the scale from 2.2% to 6.7%. 
Is this effect of government structural consumption is specific for the government related variables used 
in the above regressions? Or otherwise it represents a deeper mechanism through which government size 
and imbalances can influence happiness and life satisfaction? In order to answer this question we broaden 
our use of government indicators and test the influence of alternative variables such as public debt and 
structural government balances, calculated by the Eurostat in order to access the excessive deficits 
procedure of the EU, which are also calculated excluding the cyclical component. If high public debt and 
large government imbalances decrease happiness and life satisfaction we can be more confident on our 
purposed explanation, that relies on the negative effect that macroeconomic government imbalances may 
have on happiness and life satisfaction, due to expectations of future taxes and anticipated future austerity 
measures. In the following Section we thus present results for regressions with the alternative measures 
and perform a number of additional robustness analyses. 
 
12 
 
4.  Robustness 
4.1.The Effect of Alternative Government Measures in Individual Happiness 
and Life Satisfaction 
In this subsection we test the relationship between our two wellbeing variables – happiness and life 
satisfaction – and other public finance variables. In this case, contrary to what has been done earlier, we 
use variables that were calculated directly by the Eurostat, in particular those that are used in the excessive 
deficit procedure. Firstly, we use the structural balance of general government (the negative of the deficit), 
calculated by the Eurostat using an adjustment based on potential GDP. 
 
Table 5: Regressions for the Influence of Structural Balances on Happiness and 
Life Satisfaction in 2007 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.152001*** 7.895816*** 
  (0.4593724) (0.5362243) 
Income 
0.00000302 0.00000668** 0.0000046* 0.0000116** 
(0.00000201) (0.0000032) (0.0000027) (0.00000496) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3989941*** -0.3812285*** -0.611651*** -0.6844939*** 
(0.1217822) (0.1265099) (0.1950518) (0.2375645) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4728435*** -0.4602874*** -0.7695548*** -0.8992113*** 
(0.1143747) (0.1200266) (0.1846912) (0.2243589) 
Hours Worked 
0.0000471 -0.00083 -0.0003815 -0.0019673 
(0.0009022) (0.0009132) (0.0014003) (0.0015965) 
Education 
0.0392657*** 0.0571248*** 0.0724802*** 0.1076615*** 
(0.0075009) (0.0075841) (0.0115107) (0.0131294) 
Health 
-0.4052238*** -0.332615*** -0.6330755*** -0.5785695*** 
(0.0118887) (0.011607) (0.0182998) (0.0200027) 
Age 
-0.4902025*** 
(0.0791107) 
-0.4020285*** -0.7224199*** -0.7118062*** 
(0.1396829) (0.0794022) (0.1207544) 
Age2 0.1115573*** 0.1130982*** 0.1610844*** 0.1945019*** 
 (0.0202339) (0.020488) (0.0313954) (0.0361482) 
Married 
0.3778325*** 
(0.0308929) 
0.2572562*** 0.5707951*** 0.4136195*** 
(0.0574726) (0.0299621) (0.0484506) 
Children 
0.037737*** 
(0.0081573) 
0.0202083** 0.0585839*** 0.0302711** 
(0.0145176) (0.0082985) (0.0125975) 
Gender 
0.0529564*** 
(0.01841) 
0.0316842* 0.0743292*** 0.0407635 
(0.0324951) (0.0184257) (0.028677) 
Structural Balance 
of Gen. Gov. 
0.0744701*** 
(0.0149839) 
0.1115192*** 
(0.0150424) 
0.0662361*** 0.1963935*** 
(0.0128332) (0.0154294) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0801 0.0821 0.2765 0.2886 
Number Obs. 14810 14816 14810 14816 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, housing, and country dummies 
included in regressions, but omitted from the Table. 
In Table 5 we present regressions in which we substitute the structural government consumption variable, 
which we used earlier, with the new structural balance measure, a measure that is only available for the 
2007 database. Since available data on happiness and life satisfaction begins in 2003, we assume that an 
average of previous year’s structural balances (ranging between 2003 and 2007) is influencing happiness 
and life satisfaction in the current year. We obtain similar values for the effects of individual effects and a 
strongly positive effect of government structural balances (which is equivalent to a negative effect of 
deficits). This effect means that a 1% increase in the structural balance of the government would increase 
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happiness and life satisfaction in an amount that oscillates between 0.066 and 0.20. Thus, a 5% 
improvement on government accounts would imply an increase in 1 level (in 10) of life satisfaction and 
happiness. According to the Ordered Probit results, an additional 1% in deficit (in percentage of GDP) 
would decrease the probability of reporting the level 10 of happiness in about 1.05% (or in the case of life 
satisfaction, 1.4%).
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Table 6: Regressions for the Influence of Public Debt on Happiness and Life 
Satisfaction in 2007 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.093137*** 8.086202*** 
  (0.4421414) (0.5234773) 
Income 
0.00000324* 0.0000063** 0.00000472* 0.0000113** 
(0.00000192) (0.0000028) (0.00000257) (0.00000443) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3253964*** -0.3416401*** -0.3930418 -0.6223497** 
(0.1119254) (0.1182577) (0.2722905) (0.3080155) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4114606*** -0.4750684*** -0.5875738** -0.9386531*** 
(0.1054442) (0.1123546) (0.2655505) (0.2986186) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0004002 -0.0012928 -0.0011674 -0.0029939** 
(0.0008242) (0.0008129) (0.0013188) (0.0014484) 
Education 
0.0433858*** 0.0553147*** 0.0797399*** 0.1057201*** 
(0.0070014) (0.0070338) (0.0110163) (0.0123066) 
Health 
-0.4025707*** -0.3336939*** -0.6429343*** -0.58471*** 
(0.0107717) (0.0106194) (0.016932) (0.0184324) 
Age 
-0.4936903*** 
(0.0733333) 
-0.4212954*** -0.7397847*** -0.7511699*** 
(0.1307176) (0.0734732) (0.1148792) 
Age2 0.111361*** 0.1169483*** 0.1636763*** 0.2016455*** 
 (0.0188314) (0.0190846) (0.0299124) (0.0339936) 
Married 
0.3811907*** 
(0.0283387) 
0.2473287*** 0.7342814*** 0.3931638*** 
(0.0546116) (0.0277047) (0.0490837) 
Children 
0.0273806*** 
(0.0076089) 
0.0164** 0.0409411*** 0.0216473 
(0.0136121) (0.0076766) (0.0121408) 
Gender 
0.069363*** 
(0.0171341) 
0.0404152** 0.0980215*** 0.0540058* 
(0.0305405) (0.017178) (0.0271957) 
Public Debt 
-0.1150848*** 
(0.0126166) 
-0.1639501*** 
(0.0130849) 
-0.0099342*** -0.0107538*** 
(0.0018004) (0.0018853) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0795 0.0847 0.2778 0.2980 
Number Obs. 17244 17251 17244 17251 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, housing, and country dummies 
included in regressions, but omitted from the Table. 
 
In Table 6, we use the general government consolidated gross debt calculated for the excessive deficit 
procedure (based on the European System of Accounts (ESA) 1995) – averaged from 2002 to 2007, 
corresponding to the 2007 database. We obtain similar values for the effects of individual variables and a 
strongly negative effect of public debt. In this case, an additional 1% in debt (in percentage of GDP) would 
decrease happiness and life satisfaction in 0.01. Thus, to decrease one level in the scale, it would be 
necessary a rise in public debt equal to 100% of GDP. According to the Ordered Probit results, an 
additional 1% in debt (in percentage of GDP) would decrease the probability of reporting the level 10 of 
happiness on about 1.2% (or in the case of life satisfaction, 1.6%). 
                                                          
7
 Marginal effects for these Ordered Probit estimates are not shown in the text for space considerations, but 
are available upon request. 
14 
 
 
Table 7: Regressions for the Influence of Public Debt on Happiness and Life 
Satisfaction in  2003 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 8.535198*** 6.563614*** 
  (0.3293872) (0.3593119) 
Income 
0.00006*** 0.0001017*** 0.0000851*** 0.0001624*** 
(0.00000872) (0.00000881) (0.0000132) (0.0000141) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3923318*** -0.1630192 -0.6122368*** -0.3183591 
(0.1346769) (0.1241655) (0.215857) (0.2248268) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4855478*** -0.2563611** -0.8104646*** -0.5483238** 
(0.1327912) (0.1225157) (0.2140113) (0.2227633) 
Hours Worked 
0.000651 -0.0004375 0.0009517 -0.0008534 
(0.0007158) (0.0007243) (0.0011747) (0.0012954) 
Education 
0.0738424*** 0.0946408*** 0.14637*** 0.1893028*** 
(0.0124539) (0.0125244) (0.0205707) (0.0219483) 
Health 
-0.3597083*** -0.2903714*** -0.5698401*** -0.4995031*** 
(0.0097698) (0.0093471) (0.014979) (0.0158812) 
Age 
-0.2750215*** 
(0.0438874) 
-0.3390571*** -0.4173913*** -0.5818934*** 
(0.0783632) (0.0443508) (0.0713384) 
Age2 0.0425908*** 0.0601597*** 0.0643098*** 0.1021738*** 
 (0.0071709) (0.0072363) (0.0117675) (0.0128443) 
Married 
0.3736779*** 
(0.0273709) 
0.1964823*** 0.8112679*** 0.389683*** 
(0.0566351) (0.0272644) (0.0540411) 
Children 
0.0241429*** 
(0.0072689) 
0.0120988* 0.0367935*** 0.0140728 
(0.0128985) (0.0073352) (0.0119597) 
Gender 
0.100905*** 
(0.017418) 
0.0994375*** 0.1500234*** 0.1635632*** 
(0.0307356) (0.0173492) (0.0283905) 
Public Debt 
-0.0247495*** 
(0.0063169) 
-0.0146402** 
(0.0062747) 
0.0006326 0.0082016*** 
(0.001095) (0.0011125) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0811 0.0951 0.2833 0.3347 
Number Obs. 16364 16551 16364 16551 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, housing, and country dummies 
included in regressions, but omitted from the Table. 
 
In Table 7 we use the general government consolidated gross debt calculated for the excessive deficit 
procedure averaged from 1998 to 2003, corresponding to the 2003 database. Table 7 confirms the results 
obtained so far for the influence of public debt in happiness and life satisfaction in 2003, specifically in the 
Ordered Probit regressions. Moreover, with a 1% (of GDP) increase in public debt, the probability of 
reporting 10 in happiness will decrease 0.39%, or 0.16%, if we look at life satisfaction, a much lower 
effect than the ones obtained in 2007. Contrary to other results, there is a small positive effect of public 
debt in the OLS regression for life satisfaction. From the OLS regression we can observe that a 1% (of 
GDP) increase in public debt would contribute to increase life satisfaction in 0.008, which is a 
quantitatively small effect as it means that to increase 1 unit in the welfare scale, the country would have to 
rise public debt to 125% (of GDP)! 
Thus, with two exceptions in the OLS regressions for 2003, all government related variables; calculated 
excluding the effects of business cycles, decrease significantly happiness and life satisfaction in European 
countries. 
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4.2.Differences Across Income Distribution and Across Eurozone Countries versus 
Non Eurozone Countries 
 
In this section we want to evaluate if the negative effect of government related variables in happiness and 
life satisfaction is different across income levels and also between Eurozone countries and non-Eurozone 
countries.
8
  
The first issue is important as the literature points out that the eventual positive effect of government 
variables in happiness and life satisfaction may be due to welfare policies, thus affecting essentially the 
poorest of the society. We define as high-income, people that present a monthly income that is above the 
fourth quartile of the distribution and as low-income, people who earn a monthly income that is below the 
median.  
The second issue is important to access potential differences in the effect of government variables on 
happiness and life satisfaction between the countries of the Eurozone and European Union (EU) countries 
outside the Eurozone. It would be reasonable to assume that the tighter budgetary limits in the Eurozone 
would imply a lower effect of government structural balances and consumption in happiness and life 
satisfaction.  
In this section, due to similarities in the results between several tested specifications, we will not present 
results for Life Satisfaction and the influence of structural government consumption (Stgov). However, 
these regressions are available upon request. Table 8 analyses the differences from the consideration of a 
sample with the Eurozone countries and another with other European Countries in 2007. Table 9 does the 
same for 2003. Table 10 analyses the differences from a group including the richest people in the sample 
and another group including the poorest people in the sample. Table 11 does the same but for the 2003 
data. 
In Table 8, we can observe that there are interesting differences between effects within the Euro zone and 
effects outside the Eurozone: having children seems to contribute to happiness within the countries of the 
Eurozone (in opposition to what happens in countries outside the Eurozone) and being male seems to 
increase happiness in countries out of the Eurozone while this is not a significant determinant of happiness 
in the Eurozone. There are statistical significant differences for unemployment in the two groups of 
countries, although the differences obtained through the different estimators are not consistent. Concerning 
the effect of structural government consumption, it seems clear that the effect within the Eurozone is 
weaker than the effect outside the Eurozone, as expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Since in this section we are dealing with more homogeneous (and smaller) samples, we did not introduce 
country dummies. Additionally, some of the Ordered Probit regressions have convergence problems when 
country dummies are included. 
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Table 8: Regressions for Happiness in 2007 – Eurozone versus non-Eurozone Countries 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Countries Euro Non-euro Euro Non-euro 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.568148*** 9.844022*** 
  (0.4133738) (0.4591209) 
Income 
0.00000854* 0.00000741* 0.0000134* 0.0000113* 
(0.00000496) (0.00000402) (0.00000726) (0.00000587) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.4061119*** -0.2242752 -0.1726138 -0.3628983 
(0.1482891) (0.173098) (0.349504) (0.2981225) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4797851*** -0.4068601** -0.3282303 -0.7541306*** 
(0.1361309) (0.1658498) (0.337628) (0.2859747) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0007465 -0.0062319*** -0.0019358 -0.0111902*** 
(0.0011325) (0.0011539) (0.0017443) (0.0019957) 
Education 
0.0599738*** 0.0907292*** 0.1032501*** 0.1681531*** 
(0.0088756) (0.0105141) (0.0133168) (0.0179658) 
Health 
-0.3885992*** -0.3932346*** -0.594284*** -0.6758371*** 
(0.0153012) (0.0144478) (0.0235345) (0.0240676) 
Age 
-0.5012648*** 
(0.103176) 
-0.4032876*** -0.728965*** -0.6375953*** 
(0.1777471) (0.1044307) (0.1534967) 
Age2 0.1153914*** 0.1084991*** 0.1664231*** 0.1677141*** 
 (0.0266491) (0.0265844) (0.0400391) (0.0459263) 
Married 
0.3729088*** 
(0.0385466) 
0.3627716*** 0.7307092*** 0.6149431*** 
(0.0716264) (0.0416106) (0.068637) 
Children 
0.0532164*** 
(0.0098465) 
0.0072491 0.0818325*** 0.0033682 
(0.0195953) (0.011278) (0.0149103) 
Gender 
0.024633 
(0.0243913) 
0.1111339*** 0.0371588 0.1707168*** 
(0.0408418) (0.023869) (0.0373751) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-1.597157** 
(0.7121518) 
-11.28381*** 
(0.6035382) 
-1.640958 -19.54372*** 
(1.083751) (1.064379) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0579 0.0739 0.2032 0.2656 
Number Obs. 8579 8665 8579 8665 
Notes 
Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); 
*(10%). Marital Status, professional, and housing dummies included, but omitted 
from the Table. 
 
In 2003 some differences between the Eurozone and other countries also arise, as can be seen in Table 9 
below. Unemployment is now clearly more important as a determinant of happiness in the Eurozone 
countries. Now, education, having children, and being male are stronger determinants of happiness out of 
the Eurozone than in the Eurozone countries. Concerning the effect of structural government 
consumption, we note that the 2007 results are not replicated in 2003. In this year both groups of 
countries present a significantly negative effect, with no relevant distinction between them. 
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Table 9: Regressions for Happiness in 2003 – Eurozone versus non-Eurozone 
Countries 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Countries Euro Non-euro Euro Non-euro 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.955948*** 9.107915*** 
  (0.353643) (0.5121071) 
Income 
0.0001229*** 0.00012*** 0.0001999*** 0.0001949*** 
(0.00000969) (0.0000119) (0.0000145) (0.0000187) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.4393708*** -0.3627788 -0.6953463*** -0.3082216 
(0.1554018) (0.2397473) (0.2338912) (0.335646) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.5543784*** -0.4549501* -0.9913455*** -0.4658808 
(0.1565406) (0.234553) (0.2416252) (0.3240451) 
Hours Worked 
0.000684 -0.0010077 0.0006766 -0.0022035 
(0.0009507) (0.0010245) (0.0014689) (0.0018478) 
Education 
0.0191021 0.1079797*** 0.0477642* 0.2207662*** 
(0.0173121) (0.0175302) (0.0280206) (0.0309773) 
Health 
-0.3540828*** -0.359244*** -0.5361274*** -0.6239364*** 
(0.0129667) (0.0136111) (0.0189145) (0.022532) 
Age -0.3052281*** 
(0.0599948) 
-0.2333526*** -0.4681171*** -0.3756706*** 
(0.1156225) (0.0643621) (0.0915937) 
Age2 0.0486157*** 0.0435429*** 0.0754449*** 0.0710835*** 
 (0.0099402) (0.0102383) (0.0153085) (0.0185004) 
Married 0.3384212*** 
(0.0358512) 
0.2996646*** 0.4953292*** 0.5190673*** 
(0.0755466) (0.0420085) (0.0567593) 
Children 0.0172804* 
(0.0095494) 
0.0247579** 0.0254036* 0.0353257* 
(0.0206338) (0.0114784) (0.0151994) 
Gender 0.034055 
(0.0239688) 
0.167137*** 0.0412643 0.274095*** 
(0.0448405) (0.0251717) (0.0373859) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-5.522587*** 
0.674037) 
-5.268*** 
(0.58531)56 
-8.029281*** -9.919494*** 
(1.098872) (1.076152) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 8718 0.0738 0.2106 0.2626 
Number Obs. 0.0610 7646 8718 7646 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, and housing dummies included, but 
omitted from the Table. 
 
There are also interesting differences in the determinants of happiness between the richest and the 
poorest. In fact, as we can see in Table 10 regarding 2007, for high-income earners, income and 
unemployment are not statistically significant in the explanation of happiness, a quite intuitive result. It 
seems that there is also a less significant effect of structural government consumption in high-income 
agents than in the poorest. This indicates that our effect is different from the potential positive effect that 
welfare state expenditures have on happiness of the poorest, supporting our approach on the analysis of 
the influence of structural consumption, which excludes counter-cyclical expenditures such as 
unemployment subsidies (automatic stabilizers) or some discretionary measures of poverty alleviation. 
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Table 10: Regressions for Happiness in 2007 – Differences between High-
Income Earners and Low-Income Earners 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Individuals High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 8.686379*** 7.777394*** 
  (0.7025152) (0.5805595) 
Income 
-0.0000000527 0.0006612*** 0.000000661 0.0012422*** 
0.00000164 0.0000562 (0.00000190) 0.0001007 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.2765138 -0.2973768* -0.2006755 -0.1709532 
0.1918318 0.1584862 (0.3407431) 0.4072372 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.1027897 -0.4291308*** -- -0.4338661 
0.2246365 0.1509682  0.3979505 
Hours Worked 
-0.0003298 -0.0026463** -0.0011353 -0.0052094** 
0.0016151 0.0011489 (0.0020309) 0.0020842 
Education 
0.0247298** 0.0936287*** 0.0416819*** 0.1713247*** 
0.0125276 0.011179 (0.0157975) 0.0202102 
Health 
-0.3417024*** -0.3938565*** -0.4229169*** -0.7245214*** 
0.0202804 0.0153753 (0.0272783) 0.0268952 
Age -0.6054246*** 
0.1511379 
-0.3814767*** -0.7472762*** -0.649254*** 
0.1980303 0.1106464 (0.1884626) 
Age2 0.1522419*** 0.1008702*** 0.1869221*** 0.1729274*** 
 0.0422918 0.0265799 (0.0532503) 0.0479469 
Married 0.3001342*** 
0.0587513 
0.298259*** 0.7497929*** 0.5259276*** 
0.0771083 0.0424206 (0.1400172) 
Children 0.0634793*** 
0.0148166 
0.0252305** 0.0708687*** 0.044782** 
0.0200138 0.0109304 (0.0183725) 
Gender 0.0698762** 
0.032578 
0.1055287*** 0.0652152 0.1938793*** 
0.0460938 0.0254113 (0.0410735) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-2.947929** 
1.183408 
-5.319798*** 
0.6141005 
-2.101765 -9.414843*** 
(1.456999) 1.127548 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0371 0.0564 0.1119 0.2158 
Number Obs. 4821 7874 4821 7874 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, and housing dummies included, but 
omitted from the Table. Unemployment_lr was excluded in column (3) due to 
multicollinearity issues. 
 
In 2003 almost all the results of 2007 are confirmed, as can be seen in Table 11, but in this case also 
education is a worse predictor of happiness for the richest than for the poorest. The interesting conclusion 
according to which structural government consumption (negatively) affect more the happiness of the 
poorest than that of the richest prevails also in 2003. 
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Table 11: Regressions for Happiness in  2003 – High-Income Earners and Low-
Income Earners 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Individuals High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.23637*** 8.254977*** 
  (0.4489854) (0.6469352) 
Income 
0.0000645*** 0.000616*** 0.0000706*** 0.0012761*** 
0.0000159 0.0000795 (0.000019) (0.0001521) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.1905951 -0.4808955** -0.2462002 -0.4703156 
0.309707 0.2309623 (0.3645275) (0.5008158) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.2081445 -0.5108766** -0.3461647 -0.5432214 
0.3253696 0.226716 (0.3849695) (0.4940437) 
Hours Worked 
0.0023433 0.0010261 0.0025536 0.0016376 
0.0016229 0.0009959 (0.0019382) (0.0019042) 
Education 
-0.0472612* 0.1164895*** -0.0458441 0.235442*** 
0.0265393 0.0183443 (0.0313681) (0.0355814) 
Health 
-0.3588903*** -0.3460005*** -0.4143546*** -0.6571576*** 
0.0189809 0.0146213 (0.0220163) (0.0261736) 
Age -0.2934693*** 
0.1025129 
-0.1926082*** -0.3745665*** -0.3456678*** 
(0.1252738) 0.0654079 (0.121873) 
Age2 0.0457528*** 0.0327819*** 0.0591792*** 0.0589908*** 
 0.0170558 0.0101963 (0.0202666) (0.019591) 
Married 0.3761402*** 
0.0612621 
0.3334035*** 0.92045*** 0.7293897*** 
(0.0759624) 0.0451398 (0.1712325) 
Children 0.055296*** 
0.0172589 
0.0047346 0.0610156*** 0.0097042 
(0.0211193) 0.0109152 (0.0207616) 
Gender 0.0760193** 
0.0361744 
0.1007601*** 0.0874909** 0.1807097*** 
(0.0502694) 0.0260712 (0.042956) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-3.373533** 
1.374285 
-3.191033*** 
0.5306012 
-3.39242** -5.952919*** 
(1.701827) (1.022862) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0533 0.0485 0.1552 0.1872 
Number Obs. 3809 7191 3809 7191 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, and housing dummies included, but 
omitted from the Table. 
 
4.3. Nonlinearities in the Effect of Government on Happiness 
 
As noted earlier, most literature concluded for a positive effect of government expenditures (or at 
least of some components of government expenditures) on happiness. Hessami (2010), despite 
finding a global positive influence of Government expenditures in happiness (when nonlinear 
terms for government expenditure are not introduced in regressions), also found evidence of an 
inverted-U relationship between these variables, in a result that seems to be similar to ours. 
However, a closest look on his figures highlights that the negative part of the non-linear 
relationship is above the relevant levels of the government share. Thus, Hessami in fact 
continues to predict a positive relationship between both variables, even if nonlinear terms are 
introduced in regressions.  
We also test the quadratic term of the government expenditures variables in our sample. 
Interestingly, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between government structural 
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expenditures and happiness, for a majority of our measures. However, in our case, this inverted 
U-shaped relationship is empirically relevant. In fact, the maximum of the inverted-U happens 
for relatively low levels of structural debt or deficit. This also happens maintaining the overall 
significance of other variables in the regressions. In Table 12, we present the coefficients for the 
government variables in several regressions which specification is similar to those in the 
previous Tables, as well as the implied thresholds of government measures above which there is 
a negative relationship between the government burden measures and happiness. 
 
Table 12: Nonlinearities in the Effect of Government in Happiness and Life 
Satisfaction 
Method Ordered Probit 
 Happiness  Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression 2007 2007 2003 2003 
Structural 
Government 1 
32.12483*** 14.49916*** 19.47735*** 23.28685*** 
(2.446421) (2.478086) (2.180277) (2.083482) 
Structural 
Government 12 
-235.209*** -154.532*** -136.373*** -170.639*** 
(13.70642) (13.78968) (11.93302) (11.32107) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0679 0.0626 0.0719 0.0777 
Number Obs. 17244 17251 16364 16551 
Implied Threshold 0.06829 0.046913 0.071412 0.068234 
Method OLS 
 Happiness  Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression 2007 2007  2003 2003 
Structural 
Government 1 
57.63827*** 34.8627*** 38.61399*** 49.7246*** 
(4.176799) (4.784786) (3.798728) (3.99138) 
Structural 
Government 12 
-416.351*** -336.072*** -264.58*** -357.906*** 
(23.92334) (27.22408) (21.05245) (21.85127) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.2444 0.2361 0.2560 0.2854 
Number Obs. 17244 17251 16364 16551 
Implied Threshold 0.069218 0.051868 0.072972 0.069466 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Income, Unemployment_sr, Unemployment_lr, Hours Worked, 
Education, Health, Age and Age squared, Married, Children, Gender, Marital 
Status, professional, and housing dummies included in regressions, but omitted 
from the Table. 
 
Considering the median of the structural expenditure measure (6.98% in 2007 and 7.25% in 
2003) and the implied threshold levels reported in Table 12, it is always true that the negative 
effect of structural expenditure in happiness and life satisfaction began before the median and 
thus being valid for more than 50% of the sample. Alternatively saying, for structural 
expenditures above nearly 5% to 7%, a strong and significant negative effect of expenditures on 
happiness occurs. It is also true that a positive effect occurs for government expenditures below 
those thresholds. When we use our alternative variables for the government weight in the 
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economy, these results are confirmed, except when we use the structural government balance. In 
this case, the additional squared term on the Structural Balance of General Government would 
appear with a significant positive sign, which mean an overall significant positive effect of 
surpluses, either linear or quadratic. In the case of the public debt variable, for 2007, there is 
evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between debt and happiness and life satisfaction. 
Threshold values oscillate between 41.1% and 55.1% (while the median is 48.78%), also 
indicating that above a value near the debt median, there is a negative effect of debt on happiness 
and life satisfaction. In the 2003 sample, there is a stronger evidence for a linear effect on 
happiness regressions, as in these cases only the linear term is statistically significant. In the 
2003 life satisfaction regressions, there is evidence of the inverted U relationship with threshold 
levels of debt from 62% (Probit case) to 73% (OLS case).  
 
Figure 1: A Typical Inverted-U Shaped Effect of Structural Government Expenditure 
Share on Happiness 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the OLS 2007 regression for happiness and highlights that considering this 
inverted U relationship, differences in structural government expenditure may account for 
differences in happiness that can amount to 2 points (which mean a quantitative important effect 
of 20% of the whole scale). 
 
4.4. The Effect of GDP per capita and Inflation on Happiness 
 
As previous literature also included other macroeconomic variables (e.g. Hessami, 2010) as determinants 
of happiness, we want to further test our results against the insertion of other macroeconomic variables. 
The most important macroeconomic variables to relate with happiness are GDP per capita (which in fact 
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can be a substitute of average income, as mentioned above in footnote 1) and inflation. Previous literature 
has found positive effects of GDP per capita and negative effects of inflation.
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In Table 13 we introduce GDP per capita and inflation, separately due to possible multicollinearity issues 
between these macroeconomic variables. In fact, correlations between inflation and GDP per capita are 
73% in 2007 and 63% in 2003. Additionally, correlations with structural government consumption are 
also high (above 55%). Despite this potential multicollinearity effect, when testing all the three 
macroeconomic variables simultaneously, structural government consumption also affects negatively 
happiness and life satisfaction in 2003 and 2007, with high statistical significance.  
Also worth noting are the statistically significant effects of GDP per capita and inflation, in line with 
previous references. In an additional experiment in which an interaction term between the log of GDP per 
capita and our measure of structural government consumption, we note that despite the high significance 
of the negative sign of government structural consumption, the interaction appears with a significant 
positive sign, meaning that the negative effect of the government consumption decreases as per capita 
GDP increases, confirming the effect observed earlier when we split the sample using individual income. 
This also highlights the even higher importance of keeping with low government consumption in lower 
income countries. The non-linear inverted U relationship showed earlier is also robust to the introduction 
of GDP per capita, inflation and the interaction between GDP per capita and structural government 
consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 GDP per capita is the real GDP per capita (at chain index PPPs) from the Penn World Tables 7.1 and the 
inflation rate is the annual average rate of change of the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) from 
the Eurostat. Each enters as averages from 1998 to 2003 to the 2003 regressions and as averages from 2002 
to 2007 to 2007 regressions. 
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Table 13: Regressions for Happiness – Additional Macroeconomic Variables 
Method Ordered Probit 
Regression 2007 2003 2007 2003 
Income 
0.00000239 0.0000749*** 0.00000612** 0.000113*** 
(0.00000184) (0.00000822) (0.00000269) (0.00000747) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3120506*** -0.3937637*** -0.321949** -0.4111775*** 
(0.1129276) (0.1332108) (0.136126) (0.1338447) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4224314*** -0.5043331*** -0.4274085*** -0.5296335*** 
(0.1063461) (0.1312603) (0.1076402) (0.1318407) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0011925 0.0012294* -0.001032 0.0003595 
(0.0008099) (0.0007038) (0.0008184) (0.0006998) 
Education 
0.0685659*** 0.0674656*** 0.0648487*** 0.0618735** 
(0.0066886) (0.0123183) (0.0068048) (0.0123231) 
Health 
-0.3823063*** -0.3451089*** -0.3910569*** -0.3562783*** 
(0.0104863) (0.0093744) (0.0106295) (0.0092927) 
Age 
-0.5076532*** 
(0.0730736) 
-0.2637692*** -0.4878694*** -0.2650389*** 
(0.043653) (0.0436538) (0.0742909) 
Age2 0.1189439*** 0.0427534*** 0.1174614*** 0.0451776*** 
 (0.01874) (0.0071082) (0.0191137) (0.0071144) 
Married 
0.3645888*** 
(0.0280676) 
0.3531178*** 0.3562828*** 0.3260434*** 
(0.0269787) (0.0271455) (0.0284321) 
Children 
0.0384466*** 
(0.0074359) 
0.0209074*** 0.0415198*** 0.0206059** 
(0.007288) (0.0072714) (0.0074993) 
Gender 
0.0680279*** 
(0.0170119) 
0.1006638*** 0.0489423** 0.0977438*** 
(0.017315) (0.0173027) (0.0172743) 
Structural 
Government 1 
-3.162588*** 
(0.5283027) 
-2.352201*** 
(0.4933928) 
-6.760562*** -5.216548*** 
(0.4449772) (0.4014171) 
GDP pc (in logs) 0.3328221*** 0.2635892*** -- -- 
(0.0215387) (0.0257493)   
Inflation 
 
-- -- -0.0370589*** -0.0032596*** 
  (0.0028624) (0.0008853) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0681 0.0714 0.0663 0.0699 
Number Obs. 17244 16364 16714 16364 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%). Marital Status, professional, and housing dummies included in 
regressions, but omitted from the Table. 
 
Table 13 shows the robustness of the negative effect structural government consumption has on happiness 
despite the introduction of others (also significant) macroeconomic variables.
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5. Conclusions 
 
Contrary to the scarce existing evidence on the relationship between government consumption, welfare 
state, and happiness (or life satisfaction), we obtained a robust negative effect of structural government 
consumption in happiness and life satisfaction. This relationship has been identified despite the effects of 
the usual individual determinants of happiness (such as income, health, age, children, education, among 
others) for data collected in the European Quality of Life Survey in 2003 and 2007. The result is broadly 
maintained for other government related variables, such as structural government balances and public 
debt (calculated from the excessive debt procedure of the EU). Regarding the effect of government 
consumption on happiness (or life satisfaction), we have identified a slightly weaker effect within the 
Eurozone than within other European countries outside the Eurozone. Regarding differences between the 
                                                          
10
 As before, the relationship was also tested for life satisfaction and using the OLS regression, always with 
similar results. 
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richest and the poorest in Europe, we could identify a relatively stronger effect on the poorest. This 
finding seems to indicate that this long-run effect is not capturing the reasonable positive effect that 
welfare counter-cyclical expenditures, such as unemployment subsidies, may have in the poorest and 
emphasizes that the effect highlighted in this paper is a structural (or long-run) one, mostly linked with 
fear of future taxes or austerity measures. Even when we consider a quadratic term for the government 
variables, there is evidence for a statistically significant inverted-U shaped relationship between 
government variables and happiness that suggests that government burden decreases happiness above 
relatively low values of debt and deficits. When the U-shaped relationship does not arise, the linear or 
non-linear strictly positive relationship arises, as is the case with the structural balance of government 
account. Our final robustness analysis also found negative effects of structural government consumption 
on happiness and life satisfaction given the also significant effects of other macroeconomic variables such 
as GDP per capita and inflation. 
These results are challenging to the literature as, contrary to some previous ones, indicate a negative and 
robust effect of government expenditures and imbalances on happiness and life satisfaction, which should 
decrease the incentives of politicians to increase the government size in order to appraise their electors. 
These results are also consistent with people valuing both present and future prospects of macroeconomic 
stability and fearing future measures of austerity. Future research may test this relationship using future 
waves of the EQLS, while maintaining the definition of structural government consumption. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.A – Definition and Sources Variables 
NAME ABREVIATION DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT SOURCES 
COUNTRY cnt Data for 2007 
1- Austria 
2- Belgium 
3- Bulgaria 
4- Cyprus 
5- Czech Republic 
6- Denmark 
7- Estonia 
8- Finland 
9- France 
10- Germany 
11- UK 
12- Greece 
13- Hungary 
14- Ireland 
15- Italy 
16- Latvia 
17- Lithuania 
18- Luxembourg 
19- Malta 
20- Netherlands 
21- Poland 
22- Romania 
23- Slovakia 
24- Slovenia 
25- Spain 
26- Sweden 
27- Turkey 
28- Portugal 
29- Croatia 
30- Norway 
31- Macedonia 
Data for 2003 
1- Austria 
2- Belgium 
3- Bulgaria 
4- Cyprus 
5- Czech Republic 
6- Denmark 
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7- Estonia 
8- Finland 
9- France 
10- Germany 
11- UK 
12- Greece 
13- Hungary 
14- Ireland 
15- Italy 
16- Latvia 
17- Lithuania 
18- Luxembourg 
19- Malta 
20- Netherlands 
21- Poland 
22- Romania 
23- Slovakia 
24- Slovenia 
25- Spain 
26- Sweden 
27- Turkey 
28- Portugal 
AGE CATEGORY agec For 2007: 
1- 18-34 
2- 35-64 
3- +65 
For 2003: 
1- 18-24 
2- 25-34 
3- 35-49 
4- 50-64 
5- +65 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
AGE CATEGORY 
SQUARED
 
Agec
2 
Calculated using the squared age´s 
values. 
 
GENDER gen 1- Male 
2- Female 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
mar1 1- Married or living with partner; 0 
otherwise 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
mar2 1- Separated or divorced and not living 
with partner; 0 otherwise 
mar3 1- Widowed and not living with 
partner; 0 otherwise 
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mar4 1- Never married and not living with 
partner; 0 otherwise 
EDUCATION edu Education level for 2007– ISCED 
1- Isced 0 = pre-primary education 
2- Isced 1 = primary education 
3- Isced 2 = lower secondary education 
4- Isced 3 = upper secondary education 
5- Isced 4 = post-secondary non 
terciary education 
6- Isced 5 = first stage of tertiary 
education 
7- Isced 6 = second stage of tertiary 
education (advanced research 
qualification) 
Education level  for 2003– ISCED 
1 Primary education 
2 Secondary education 
3 University 
4 None 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
NR. CHILDRENS chil Number of children European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
TYPE OF 
HABITATION 
Hou1 1- Own without mortgages European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) Hou2 1- Own with mortgages 
Hou3 1- Tenant, paying rent to private 
landlord 
Hou4 1- Tenant, paying rent in 
social/voluntary/municipal housing 
Hou5 1- Accommodation is provided rent free 
Hou6 1- Other 
INCOME inc Household´s total net monthly income, in 
euro 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemp12 
UnempX 
Dummies for Unemployed less 12 m and for 
Unemployed 12 m or more 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
NR. HOURS 
WORKED 
hwk Number of hours work(ed) per week, 
including any paid or unpaid overtime 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
LIFE 
SATISFACTION 
lif Life Satisfaction Scale - all things considered, 
how satisfied would you say you are with 
your life: 
1-  1 (very dissatisfied) 
2-  2  
3-  3 
4-  4 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
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5-  5 
6-  6 
7-  7 
8-  8 
9-  9 
10- 10 (Very satisfied) 
HAPPINESS hap Happiness Scale -  taking all things together, 
how happy would you say you are, using a 
scale: 
1-  1(Very unhappy) 
2-  2 
3-  3 
4-  4 
5-  5 
6-  6 
7-  7 
8-  8 
9-  9 
10- 10 (Very happy) 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
HEALTH hea In general, would you say your health is: 
1- Very good 
2- Good 
3- Fair 
4- Bad 
5- Very bad 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
STRUCTURAL 
GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION 
stgov GDP 
= 
@' $ℎ × B5C5 × 1000FG 
 
Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
transformed GDP in GDP Trend and GDP 
Cycle 
 
Government Consumption 
= 
@HI × ' $) × B5C5 × 1000FJ ÷ 100G 
 
 
Structural Government Consumption 
=  
L6>'#=	.6&#$=06M5	N' O 
 
Penn World Table:  
Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina 
Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 7.1, Center for 
International 
Comparisons of 
Production, Income and 
Prices at the University 
of Pennsylvania, Nov 
2012.  
Variables:  
• POP – 
Population, in 
thousands 
• rgdpch - PPP 
Converted 
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Average 2002 – 2007 for the 2007 data 
Average 1998 – 2003 for the 2003 data 
GDP Per 
capita (Chain 
Series), at 
2005 constant 
prices 
• kg - 
Government 
Consumption 
Share of PPP 
Converted 
GDP Per 
capita at 2005 
constant prices 
[rgdpl] 
• rgdpl - PPP 
Converted 
GDP Per 
capita 
(Laspeyres), 
derived from 
growth rates of 
c, g, i, at 2005 
constant prices 
STRUCTURAL 
GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION 
WITH TRENDED 
GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION 
 
stgov1 GDP 
= 
@' $ℎ × B5C5 × 1000FG 
 
Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
transformed GDP in GDP Trend and GDP 
Cycle 
 
Government Consumption 
= 
@HI × ' $) × B5C5 × 1000FJ ÷ 100G 
 
Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
transformed Government Consumption in 
Government Consumption Trend and Cycle 
 
Structural Government Consumption with 
trended Government Consumption 
=  
Penn World Table:  
Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina 
Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 7.1, Center for 
International 
Comparisons of 
Production, Income and 
Prices at the University 
of Pennsylvania, Nov 
2012.  
Variables:  
• POP – 
Population, in 
thousands  
• rgdpch - PPP 
Converted 
GDP Per 
capita (Chain 
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L6>'#=	.6&#$=06	N'M5	N' O 
 
Average 2002 – 2007 for 2007 
Average 1998 – 2003 for 2003 
Series), at 
2005 constant 
prices 
• kg - 
Government 
Consumption 
Share of PPP 
Converted 
GDP Per 
capita at 2005 
constant prices 
[rgdpl] 
• rgdpl - PPP 
Converted 
GDP Per 
capita 
(Laspeyres), 
derived from 
growth rates of 
c, g, i, at 2005 
constant prices 
STRUCTURAL 
BALANCE 
def Average 2003 – 2007 for the 2007 data. 
 
There is no data available for 2003. 
Eurostat: AMECO – 
database of the 
European 
Commission´s 
Directorate General 
for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN): 
Variable: 
Structural balance of 
general government: 
Adjustment based on 
potential GDP: 
Excessive deficit 
procedure  (UBLGAPS) 
PUBLIC DEBT gdebt Average 2002 – 2007 for the 2007 data. 
 
Average 1998 – 2003 for the 2003 data. 
Eurostat: AMECO– 
database of the 
European 
Commission´s 
Directorate General 
for Economic and 
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Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN): 
Variable: 
General government 
consolidated gross debt: 
Excessive deficit 
procedure (based on 
ESA 1995) (UDGG) 
 
